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Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to analyze when firms abuse their 
dominant position, specifically with respect to refusing to 
issue copyright licenses. The objective is to understand 
what is meant by abuse by a dominant enterprise and 
view how different jurisdictions such as the United States 
(US) and European Union (EU) have dealt with the same, 
in order to examine the ability of the Indian legal 
framework to handle such cases. The scope of the paper is 
limited to providing a comparative analysis of the EU and 
US and attempts to apply the same to India. This paper 
seeks to explore whether competition law and intellectual 
property law intersect with each other and seeks to 
examine when   dominant conduct can be regarded as 
abusive. The paper also scrutinizes how the US and EU 
courts have dealt with cases of denial of IPR license and 
whether the Indian scenario is well equipped to 
effectively handle cases of refusal to license. 
Keywords: Abuse of Dominance, Article 82 of European 
Communities Treaty (ECT), Competition Act, 2002, Essential 
Facilities Doctrine, Section 2 of Sherman Act, 1890 
1. Introduction 
Competition law and IPR intersect when it comes to ensuring an 
equilibrium between market access and safeguarding 
                                                          








innovation.1Competition law seeks to ensure that there are uniform 
standards of growth for all actors operating in the market. 
However, the extent of power exercised by all the actors is not 
always the same and this means that some gain a dominant 
position vis-a-vis others. While being in this dominant position is 
not prejudicial to competition, it is a cause of concern for the 
competition regulation authorities. 
The common perception is that antitrust legislations safeguard 
competition, while IP law rewards innovation to incentivize 
creation of new products in the market. The common focus of the 
two fields of law is to enhance technical progress for the ultimate 
benefit of consumers. The forces operating in the market would be 
more open to experiments and to innovate if they are assured of no 
free riders and if they are faced with strong competition. Hence IPR 
excludes competition by imitation and promotes competition 
through substitution. As can be observed in IMS Health2, 
competition law seeks to afford protection to those keen to 
introduce new products in the market and are unable to do so 
without grant of licenses. It does not safeguard those who attempt 
to imitate the existing products, as reflected in Magill3.The refusal 
to issue IPR licenses is not, per se, anti-competitive since an 
obligation to do so would restrict the exclusivity granted to IPR 
owners.4 At the same time, dominant firms cannot be allowed to 
create monopolies over the market by exercising control over 
ancillary markets. In some cases, an effective regime of IPR affords 
enterprises with dominance in the relevant markets. The potential 
of dominance which IPR provides has increased with the growth of 
new technologies. The TRIPs agreement also recognizes the 
intersection of IPR and competition law by allowing its members to 
                                                          
1 Copyright, Competition and Development, REPORT BY THE MAX PLANCK 
INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL. 
2 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & CoKG (C418/01) 
[2004] E.C.R. I-5039 (ECJ (5th Chamber). 
3 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications 
Ltd (ITP) v. Commission, Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, 1995 
E.C.R. I-743. 
4 Microsoft v Commission, T 201/04 Section 289. 
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make laws restraining anti-competitive practices of licensing which 
may be an abuse of IPR. 
Denying access to crucial IPRs to competitors and other players in 
the market has emerged as a serious concern in the technology 
sector. The question which forms the focus of the debate is the 
extent to which the dominant IP owners must be permitted to 
exercise their prerogatives. This is important to ascertain when it 
may be regarded as abuse and when the owner of the IPR is 
required to share the right with others. The researcher seeks to 
carry out the analysis in the context of India, after comparing the 
approaches in the EU and US. It is seen that though there are some 
common traits between the EU and US approach, the US generally 
tends to favor IPR over other competition related concerns. The EU, 
however, has created an approach where, in exceptional 
circumstances, the refusal to license amounts to abuse of 
dominance. India can gain from how the EU and US have dealt 
with cases of refusal and incorporate the best practices from the 
international framework, in its approach. The researcher begins 
with a brief introduction about what constitutes abuse of 
dominance and then engages in a comparative analysis of the EU, 
US and India.  
2. Abuse of Dominance 
Abuse of dominance takes place when the IPR holder’s refusal to 
issue license inordinately hampers competition in the market. 
Dominance occurs where a company is in a strong position of 
control over a certain market and it is able to act without 
considering the behaviours or effects on customers or competitors. 
Dominance of an enterprise can be ascertained by several factors 
such as market share, resources, size of competitors, dependence of 
consumers, source of dominant position, entry barriers, etc.5When 
technical knowledge is restricted from being shared with other 
firms, it constitutes abuse of dominance, since the IPR is used to 
                                                          
5 Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs Competition Committee, 
Roundtable on Safe Harbours and Legal Presumptions in Competition Law - 
Note by India , 6, available at https://one.oecd.org/ document/ DAF/ 
COMP/WD(2017)58/en/pdf .  




deter access to information and prevent the development of 
market, by curtailing growth of alternate supply chains, which 
results in restricted access. Dominance occurs under two 
circumstances - one, where some undertakings are in a superior 
position in a market with some amount of effective competition 
existing. IP law confers market power in a way by creating barriers 
to entry for competitors offering the same good or even its 
substitutes. The extent of market power is contingent on how 
efficiently the competitive products are kept out of the market 
Second, where there is a de facto monopoly and the competitor has 
no alternatives in terms of competition. In cases where the 
ownership of IP takes place in conjunction with de facto monopoly 
over the market which is adequate to justify dominance, then the 
ownership itself can confer dominance.  
However, the mere fact that an IP protected product falls within 
the ambit of a de facto monopoly and hence within the scope of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 1890, which states that: ‘Every person 
who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part 
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.’6or Article 82 of the 
European Community (EC)Treaty, which states that: ‘any abuse by 
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within 
the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited 
as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it may affect 
trade between Member States.’7.This by itself cannot be termed as 
abusive, as a firm achieves such monopoly on account of its 
investments in IP and R&D, and is usually entitled to continue 
competing through its exclusionary rights in aftermarkets as well. 
Merely having a dominant position cannot be regarded as abuse. 
Abuse occurs when the enterprise in a dominant position behaves 
in a way which influences the market structure, by way of 
distortion of competition. At times, the refusal to issue licenses also 
restricts the competition in downstream markets. The refusal to 
license not only manifests in the market of the product or service, 
but it also acts a tool for obtaining leverage and protecting itself 
                                                          
6 15 U.S. Code §  2. 
7Art. 82 of the EC Treaty. 
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from competitive forces in other markets. Such conduct can be 
abusive, if the firm which has economic advantage, because of its 
dominant position in one market, uses this to gain commercial 
advantage in adjacent markets.8 
Dominant position refers to the economically strong position of an 
undertaking that allows it to distort effective competition in the 
relevant market by enabling it to act independent of other actors. 9 
This doctrine was expanded in Hoffman-La Roche10where the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) noted that such a position doesn’t 
imply that competition is precluded like in cases of monopoly but 
permits the undertaking profiting by it to have significant influence 
on the market conditions under which the competition develops. 
The case also acknowledged that though there are several factors to 
determine dominance of a firm, apart from a large market share, 
there are other important criteria such as the technology lead, 
developed sales network, absence of competition, etc. 
Some abuses, though not listed under Article 82, still qualify as an 
abuse. For instance, refusal to deal with competitors or refusal to 
supply or license are also read into the scope of Article 82 by courts 
as abuse. While refusal to supply is linked to tangible property, 
refusal to license is related to IPR. The remedy available for abusive 
refusals to license, is the imposition of compulsory licensing on IPR 
holders.11 
                                                          
8 H. Apostolopoulos, Refusal-to-Deal Cases of IP Rights at the Aftermarket in 
the US and EU Law: Converging of Both Law Systems Through Speaking the 
Same Language of Law and Economics,7, CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW144-148 (2007). 
9 Case 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal 
BV v Commission [1978] ECR207, Abuse of Dominant Position in Light of 
Legal Principles and Case Laws in the EC, 13, OFFICE FOR COMPETITION 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, Warsaw (2003). 
10 Hoffmann-La Roche &. Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 as cited in 
G. Monti, The Concept of Dominance under Article 82, available at 
https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/staff%20publications%20full
%20text/monti/ECJdominancepaper.pdf. 
11 E. Derclaye, Abuses of dominant position and intellectual property rights: a 
suggestion to reconcile the Community courts case law, KLUWER LAW 
INTERNATIONAL, 689 (2003). 




3. The EU Perspective 
The EU law addresses the intersection between IPR and 
competition law vide Article 82 of the EC which states that 
competition law can act only in exceptional circumstances to 
restrict the lawful use of IPR. The Volvo12 judgement which held 
that the refusal to license a right by itself doesn’t amount to abuse 
of dominance, still remains as a valid legal principle with respect to 
the application of Article 82 of the EC. The court reiterated that the 
mere refusal to license, though may seem selfish and unjustified, is 
not enough to constitute abuse of dominance and it should be 
coupled with other factors to be regarded as abuse, such as unfair 
pricing, stopping production of products in demand, etc. Hence, 
the EU law deviates from the balance between IPR and competition 
in favor of the latter, but only in exceptional circumstances and the 
general rule remains that IPR must be enforced. 
The exceptional conditions where refusal is seen as abuse of market 
power is when the said refusal has the effect of eliminating all 
competition in the relevant market, when it is not backed by any 
legitimate justification and when the products are indispensable 
and has no substitutes.13In the Magill case14 it was pointed out that a 
refusal to deal when unjustified, will be anti-competitive, if the 
owner holds an essential facility or a dominant company reserves a 
secondary downstream market for itself. Here the downstream 
market became relevant because there was a vertical link between 
the copyrighted product and the new product and the refusal 
hampered the competition in the downstream market as well. 
Hence, there was a duty to issue license. This case was crucial in 
bringing to light the fact that firms should not try to extend their 
monopoly to other markets by exercising their IPR. The test of 
indispensability of the product in the downstream market, effect on 
                                                          
12 AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd [1988] EUECJ C-238/87. 
13 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG,Case C-7/97, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791. 
14 Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications 
Ltd (ITP) v. Commission, Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, 1995 
E.C.R. I-743. 
Pallavi Khanna                                                      Abuse of Dominant Position 
51 
competition in the relevant market and restriction on developing 
new products were some of the factors espoused in this case. 
In Ladbroke15, the ‘new product’ condition was further refined and it 
was noted that the refusal to license infringes Article 82 only when 
the new product being prevented from introduction, is that which 
has a constant, regular and specific potential demand. It went on to 
add another restriction as per which the refusal contravenes Article 
82, if the product in question is essential for that activity and there 
are no substitutes available in the market. The Bronner Case 16 
prescribed a tripartite test which combined the test in Magill and 
Ladbroke, by requiring indispensability, absence of justification, and 
elimination of competition as the conditions for determining abuse. 
The IMS Case17 also followed the standard laid down by Bronner. 
In the case of Microsoft18, an ‘entirety of circumstances’ approach 
has been adopted which focused on the total factual circumstances 
surrounding the refusal, rather than a checklist of conditions. The 
licenses, where refusal amounts to limiting technical development, 
which prejudicially affects consumers, also works as a test to 
determine if abuse has taken place or not. The Microsoft cases were 
based on Article 82 of the European Communities Treaty (ECT), 
which pertains to abuse of dominance. In the first Microsoft case of 
2004, a need was felt to pierce the veil of IPR to prevent Microsoft 
from using the guise of IPR, to avoid sharing information needed to 
develop products compatible with Windows. Hence the exercise of 
IPR was disregarded as an objective justification in cases where 
exceptional circumstances were established. It was further noted 
that tying in the windows media player acts as a shield from 
competing efficient vendors and hence amounted to abuse of 
dominant position, by refusing to supply information to 
competitors for bringing new products. In 2007, when the matter 
was brought before the Court of First Instance, reference was made 
                                                          
15 Tierce Ladbroke SA v. Commission, Case T-504/93, 1997 E.C.R. II-923, 5 
C.M.L.R. 309 (1997) (Ct. First Instance). 
16 Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG,Case C-7/97, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791. 
17 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & CoKG(C418/01) 
[2004] E.C.R. I-5039 (ECJ (5th Chamber). 
18 Case T201/04, Microsoft Corp v Commission, 2007 ECR II03601. 




to the four pronged test of indispensability, new product 
requirement, objective justification and exclusion of competition in 
secondary market, in order to establish that refusal was an abuse. It 
went on to hold that complementary products did constitute 
separate products for the purpose of Article 82 of the ECT. 
Emphasis was on whether the refusal to license would reduce the 
incentives to innovate in the industry as a whole and it was 
concluded that in this particular case, nondisclosure would hamper 
innovation because of lack of competitive pressures. The essential 
facilities doctrine operates when a product is indispensable for 
competitors and other firms are unable to stay without it in the 
market.19 Hence the competitor’s products must be inter-operating 
with the product of the dominant undertaking in the main market, 
in order to categorize the product as being indispensable. The 
upstream product must be indispensable for the product in the 
downstream market and a refusal by a dominant firm in the 
former, should have the adverse effect of eliminating competition 
in the latter.20 
IMS Health21recognized conditions where compulsory licensing 
may be imposed. It was noted that compulsory licensing is valid 
when the refusal to license prevents the growth of a secondary 
market which adversely effects consumers. The refusal was held to 
be abusive only if the agency seeking IP does not wish to limit itself 
to mere duplication of goods and services offered in the secondary 
market by the IPR owner, but seeks to offer new products with 
potential demand in the market. This case was also pertinent in 
liberalizing the new product rule since it did not require the 
products to be different in character or meet specific needs of the 
consumer, but rather allowed improvements in existing traits to 
also be classified as new products. This case also clarified that 
dominant enterprises having control over indispensable inputs 
must facilitate the development of products which are its 
                                                          
19 OECD Policy Roundtables, The Essential Facilities Concept,  http:// 
www.oecd.org/competition/abuse/1920021.pdf.  
20 Id. 
21 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & CoKG(C418/01) 
[2004] E.C.R. I-5039 (ECJ (5th Chamber). 
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competitors. In IMS Health Case22, while ascertaining if developing 
a similar database was essential, it was held that the improved 
database was being used by IMS health for restricting competition 
and hence it amounts to abuse of dominance. The court 
emphasized that even though there is no general duty to issue 
licenses, the exceptional circumstances may mandate access to 
refuse IP such as bar on emergence of new product with potential 
demand, lack of justification for refusal, exclusionary effect on 
competition in secondary market. The focus of this decision was on 
the promoting of access and openness to facilitate competition in 
the market when- i) the product is crucial for  certain business, ii) 
the refusal excludes competition in the secondary market, iii) 
prevents the emergence of a new product which has potential 
demand from consumers, iv) there is no objective justification 
behind it. 
4. The US Approach 
In US, refusal to license does not imply misuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights, hence copyright owner may refuse to license its 
copyright.23 The US has witnessed a history of cases of compulsory 
licensing in the event of refusal to license. The duty to license arises 
only if there is a dominant enterprise which acts in an anti-
competitive manner in refusing to issue license. The behavior is 
analyzed keeping in mind the effect on competition, business 
justification and extension of monopoly to other markets. In 
addition to this, unlawful tie-in sales and holder entering into 
litigation to harm business, are also actors which qualify as being 
anti-competitive.  Refusal to license by a dominant enterprise has 
been regarded as unlawful exclusionary conduct. A valid rebuttal 
to the business justification of refusal is that the IP was acquired 
unlawfully.24 
                                                          
22 IMS Health GmbH & Co OHG v NDC Health GmbH & CoKG (C418/ 
01) [2004] E.C.R. I-5039 (ECJ (5th Chamber). 
23 Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 189 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1999). 
24 Data General Corporation v. Grumman Systems Support Corporation , 
36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). 




Verizon25 established that mere position of dominance and high 
pricing is lawful as well as a function of the free market economy 
as long as it is not anti-competitive. The focus was on the freedom 
of the firm to act or use its property in any way it chooses, hence 
preventing intervention of the courts in determining the dealings. 
The refusal to license extends to cover refusal to existing IPR 
holders as well by alteration of terms of license. Even then, the 
intention to monopolize is not an adequate reason to regard it as 
refusal and there must be some adverse effect on competition 
also.26 
The Antitrust-IP Guidelines, also known as the DOJ-FTC 
Guidelines for licensing, emphasize on the rule of reason rather 
than the per se doctrine and pre suppose that IP licensing gives rise 
to pro-competitive effects in the market and not merely establishes 
market power for antitrust purposes. In ‘rule of reason’, authorities 
evaluate the precompetitive efficiencies of a restrictive business 
practice against its anti-competitive effects to see if it should be 
permitted or not, while in ‘per se’ concept the activity is always 
declared to be illegal, irrespective of the efficiencies generated by 
it.27 They don’t believe that the market power imposes an 
obligation to license on the IP owner and in fact exclusivity from 
licensing encourages investments in licensed products and hence 
promotes innovation.28 
In the case of Aspen29, the Supreme Court relied on Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 1890 to affirm the liability of the dominant firm from 
                                                          
25 Verizon Communications Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, 540 US 
398 (2004). 
26 Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 1979). 
27 See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995). available at: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm 
28Survey On Compulsory Licenses Granted By WIPO Member States To Address 
Anti-Competitive Uses Of Intellectual Property Rights, WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION, 11 (2011) available athttp:// 
www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_4/cdip_4_4_rev_study
_inf_5.pdf. 
29Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 597 
(1985). 
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a refusal to deal and said it was necessary to give any consideration 
to the essential facilities doctrine (EFD). EFD implies when the 
owner of an essential facility is mandated to give access to it at 
reasonable prices. However, In Intel30, the court went on to quash 
the EF doctrine while finding that the theory is not disjunct from 
the need for a competitive relationship for liability under the 
Sherman Act. In the US, the liability for abuse of dominance under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 1890 is imposed only when the 
refusal can be called exclusionary conduct. The US judgements, 
though divergent, endorse the view that refusal to co-operate with 
rivals amounts to anti-competitive conduct.31 
The Courts played a cautious role in recognizing exceptions to the 
freedom of action of firms in Trinko32,  because of the difficulty in 
identifying forced sharing and remedying the effects of 
anticompetitive conduct by firms. In Kodak II33, the focus was on the 
exclusionary intent in the refusal to sell, which was deemed to be 
an illegal way of leveraging power in the aftermarket under Section 
2 of the Sherman Act, 1890. Moreover, the court recognized that 
obtaining IPR through fraud and it’s misuse by extending into 
other markets as the two restricting conditions on IPR. In Xerox34, 
the refusal was deemed to be within the scope of IPR and that in 
the absence of evidence of illegal tying, sham litigation or fraud, the 
IPR holder should not be subject to antitrust laws and held for 
abusing dominant position. 
5. Indian Scenario 
In India, the Competition Act holds an entity guilty of abuse, if it 
indulges in unfair pricing, limiting production of goods or services, 
                                                          
30 Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 195 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
31 R.Coco, Antitrust Liability For Refusal To License Intellectual Property: A 
Comparative Analysis and the International Setting, 12(1), MARQUETTE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW, 29-31(2008). 
32 Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP 
540 U.S. 398, 124 S.Ct. 872,157 L.Ed.2d 823 (2004). 
33 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services Inc. (90-1029), 504 U.S. 451 
(1992). 
34 SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 
U.S. 1016 (1982). 




restricting technical development or denying market access. As per 
Section 4 of the Competition Act 2002, an enterprise is said to have 
a dominant position in the market when its economic strength 
allows it to hamper effective competition in the market by 
permitting it to behave independent of its customers, competitors 
and consumers. Though it has not been expressly stated, a refusal 
to license an IPR exclusively enjoyed by a dominant firm, can be 
construed as refusal to supply under the Competition Act, under 
the provision on limiting production of goods or restricting 
technical development to the prejudice of consumers or denial of 
market access. 35 
In India, a four step process is followed, to ascertain if abuse of 
dominance is taking place. Firstly, the entities must be a group of 
interconnected enterprises. Secondly, the relevant market needs to 
be outlined. Thirdly, we need to ascertain if the company is 
dominant in the relevant market. And finally, it will have to be 
determined whether there is abuse of dominance. The Competition 
Act, 2002 does not stipulate that access would be a remedy against 
abuse of dominance arising from refusal to issue IPR licenses. 
However, some provisions may be interpreted to mean that it is 
possible to access IPR in the prevailing circumstances. As per 
Section 4(2) (c) of the Competition Act, 2002, when a dominant 
enterprise acts in a manner that has the effect of denial of market 
access, then it can be termed as abuse of dominance. This may be 
construed as including market access to a product that is protected 
by IP. Section 4 empowers Competition Commission of India (CCI) 
to issue remedial measures and this is akin to granting of 
compulsory license. Also, Section 27 of the Competition Act 
empowers the CCI to direct those engaged in abuse of dominance 
to desist from doing so by passing ‘any other order’ and hence the 
CCI may use this authority to ensure access to IPR, by compulsory 
licensing and avoiding abuse in exceptional circumstances. 36 
                                                          
35 N. S. Chopra & D. Muthappa, The Curious Case of Compulsory Licensing in 
India, 8(2),COMPETITION LAW INTERNATIONAL (2012). 
36 Dr. R. Bhardwaj,Working Paper on Enforcement of Competition Law on 
Refusal to License of Intellectual Property Rights,SCHOOL OF COMPETITION 
LAW & MARKET REGULATION, IICA (2015)at 11. 
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A complaint may be made under Section 4(2)(a)(ii) of the 
Competition Act, alleging that the price is unaffordable for the 
public and manufacturers can make it available at cheaper 
prices.37In the MCX case38, the CCI noted that the IP owner is under 
no obligation to license the IP to third parties, but when certain 
essential facilities form a part of infrastructure held by the 
dominant player, compulsory licensing may be ordered. A number 
of factors such as resources, dependency on consumers, entry 
barriers, etc. were considered to analyze entry barriers and based 
on this, the CCI ordered National Stock Exchange to extend access 
to its software, since it was in the nature of an essential facility and 
barring access to it constituted abuse of dominance. In the case of 
HT Media v. T-Series39, abuse of dominance was highlighted from 
the perspective of excessive royalty being charged. It was held that 
the 2% royalty set by the copyright board is deemed to be a 
reasonable rate and charging anything in excess of it was unfair 
and anti-competitive. 
6. Comparative Analysis of US and EU Laws 
While Article 82 of the EC Treaty bars abuse of dominant position 
by an undertaking in a way that it affects trade, section 2 of the 
Sherman Acts condemns all kinds of attempts to monopolize any 
trade by a firm wielding market power. While the Sherman act only 
outlaws monopolization or attempts to do so, the EC Treaty 
envisages only the abuse of existing dominant positions. Both the 
legislations seek to regulate the market power, so it is not 
concentrated on anticompetitive practices of the firms.40 
                                                          
37 Bayer Corporation v. Natco Pharma Ltd., Order No. 45/2013 
(Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai). 
38 MCX v. NSE case no. 13/2009. 
39 HT Media v. Super Cassettes Industries Limited CCI, Case No. 40 of 
2011. 
40 M.C. Troberg, Differences Between The US And The EU In Antitrust Review 
Of Intellectual Property: A Comparative Analysis Of The Essential Facilities 
Doctrine,  GLOBAL ANTI TRUST REVIEW, THE INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTRE 
FOR COMPETITION, LAW AND POLICY- QUEEN’S MARY UNIVERSITY, 
London, 56 (2011). 




In the US, the trend has been to shield IP against antitrust. The 
relevance of intent of the IP owner is also worth re-examining. The 
focus should be on the impact of the conduct and not the intent 
behind it. The guidelines attempt to balance IPR and competition 
law. The EU seems to be more anxious than their American 
counterparts about anticompetitive risks, which arise from the 
borderline use of IPR and the risk of losing innovation incentives.41 
Though promulgated at different times, the US and EU, through 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Article 102 of Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) have attempted to 
protect citizens by preventing companies from indulging in unfair 
behavior. This social justice approach takes the shape of dominant 
firms being prevented from exploiting and impairing the 
opportunities of rivals. The EC has clarified that anti trust liability 
is not attracted only when there is harm, but when the abusive 
conduct hampers competition in a manner that is prejudicial to 
consumers and facilitates dominant firms to reap the gains by 
increasing prices, reducing output, restricting innovation and 
consumer choice.42 In the case of Leader Business v. EC Comissions43, 
the refusal by Microsoft to permit the French software being 
marketed in Canada cheaply to be imported to France, was deemed 
to be abusive conduct asit was a breach of article 82. 44 
Indian competition law does not offer any clarity on the practice of 
compulsory licensing of IPR, hence a proper understanding of the 
EU is essential to understand the mechanism. European courts 
impose a duty to issue licenses for IPR in exceptional cases. It is 
seen that the trend has moved from a liberal to an interventionist 
approach. The CCI should act with caution. This is important since 
                                                          
41 J.Tudor,Compulsory Licensing In The European Union,4 (2),  G. MASON J. 
INT’L COM. LAW (2012). 
42 Social Justice, Innovation And Antitrust Law by M. Maggiolino in A. 
Flanagan & M.L. Montagnani, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW- 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES, 165 (2010). 




44 See J DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 159-161(2nd edn, 2003). 
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compulsory licensing may have a deterring effect on those desiring 
to enter the Indian market and IP firms may be compelled to shift 
elsewhere. This may reduce investment due to weak protection of 
IPR in issuing compulsory licenses. A better alternative would be to 
make reference vide the powers of CCI under Section 21 to the 
appropriate authority to determine if abuse of IPR has taken place 
or not. 45 
The common trait in all jurisdictions is the importance of 
determining market power and the examination of the unilateral 
conduct of enterprises. It is seen that in EU and India dominance by 
itself is not regarded as wrong, but only constitutes the first prong 
while analyzing abuse. Also, the US tends to focus on the intention 
of violation of competition law. The business justification also 
varies from meeting losses to extending benefits to consumers. 
While the US favors efficiency, the EU regards objective 
justification as important. The impact on consumers is also studied 
from different angles. While the US examines restriction in 
productivity and effect on prices, the EU seeks to ascertain 
consumer welfare. The list of activities called abusive are not 
exhaustive in EU and India since it tries to pigeonhole the different 
acts of abuse, but the US focuses on activities. The US also doesn’t 
require pre-existing dominance to regard the conduct as being 
abusive, if market power can be achieved through its conduct.46 
7. Conclusion 
Copyright must be treated by competition law in a unique manner. 
It is a product of an individual’s intellectual creativity and the 
creator has moral rights over his work, thus issuing compulsory 
licenses on such a personal asset should be done with caution. 
Hence courts should pay heed to the creativity factor, when 
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imposing compulsory licenses. However, this means that works 
will be treated subjectively and hence it may be problematic to 
analyze the level of creativity, while trying to achieve a balance 
between property right and competition law. 
The western perception has been to regard IPR as sacrosanct in 
nature and over regulation is feared for taking the color of 
protectionism. It is also viewed by some that the developing world 
is cautious of the fact that excessive competition can impair 
development.47Compulsory licenses should be issued only to 
remedy anti-competitive conduct when the dominance of a firm is 
unquestionable, no alternative remedy exists and when interests  in 
favor of the licensee are greater than the harm that may be caused 
to IPR holder’s incentive to innovate. Compulsory licensing is not 
required merely due to commercial hardship. In the case of 
Oscar48,it was noted that the distribution chain is not that vital, 
since there can be other ways of selling paper and hence there was 
no abuse of dominance, merely because the newspaper used its 
own distribution chain to capture a large share of the market and 
other small enterprises could not compete with it 
The deficiency with the EU and US approach is that no clear criteria 
has been laid down and courts have decided matters on a case to 
case basis. This inconsistency poses problems for other jurisdictions 
attempting to develop their approach on the lines of established 
cases. This means there are certain lacunae and some crucial factors 
may not be considered while deciding all cases. For instance, in 
Microsoft49, the EU paid no consideration to the development of 
new products and in fact, a new criterion for balancing incentives 
was developed. 
IPR is inevitable in markets today. Since the tests have been 
redefined and relaxed over time, they have not been followed 
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uniformly.  Even in similar circumstances, courts will use their 
discretion in deciding.  The lack of fetters on IPR owners may lead 
to more chances of abuse and hence exceptional circumstances 
require intervention of competition law for compulsory licensing. 
There is a need to make a transition from the form-based to the 
effects-based approach, which focuses on the implications of anti- 
competitive practices on consumers, by analyzing the competitive 
harm. There is a strong need to make changes in the Competition 
Act, 2002and include the access to IP as a remedy for abuse of 
dominance, under Section 27. Effective channels must be instituted 
to deal with the cases of compulsory licensing and authorities 
should examine special circumstances, as it has been done in other 
jurisdictions, when ascertaining abuse.  
 
 
 
